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INTERPRETING NEW LABOUR’S POLITICAL DISCOURSE ON
THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS

Aaron Edwards
Abstract
New Labour‟s superintendence of the Northern Ireland peace process has
re-opened debate about the party‟s stance on the “Irish question”. While
some commentators hold the view that it remains ideologically wedded to the
nationalist goal of Irish unity, it could be argued that Labour‟s Northern
Ireland policy has been characterised by an ambivalent non-interventionist
approach. The “peace strategy” pursued by Tony Blair‟s three
administrations between 1997 and 2007 is examined in light of the political
discourse articulated by key actors within New Labour itself. Moreover, the
interpretive approach in British political science is utilised to illuminate key
variables, such as ideology and values, driving the party‟s view on
sovereignty in the United Kingdom more broadly. In applying this analytical
framework the article explains how New Labour‟s policy towards Northern
Ireland underwent significant adaptation under Blair‟s leadership and why it
finally achieved its overarching objective of consigning the violent conflict to
atrophy.
Introduction
One problem with Tony [Blair]‟s fundamental view of Northern Ireland
is that the process is the policy, that as long as the process is being
sustained and you are giving plenty of evidence that you believe in the
process, even if you can do nothing else, that is sufficient policy. (Peter
Mandelson, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, cited in the
Guardian, 14 March 2007)
I would tell Tony that, no matter what, we had to try to keep things
moving forward, like a bicycle. If we let the bicycle fall over, we would
create a vacuum and that vacuum would be filled by violence … By the
end, we had realised peace was not an event but a process. (Jonathan
Powell, former Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Tony Blair, 2008, p. 5)
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This paper considers the underlying ideological dynamics of New
Labour‟s “peace strategy” in Northern Ireland by concentrating on three key
components in its political discourse: devolution, bipartisanship and
consent.1 It is argued here that these concepts underwent significant shifts in
meaning after 1994, which permitted Tony Blair to move his party from a
position of “persuaders for Irish unity” in the early 1990s to a position of
“neutral arbitration” when returned to power in 1997. Moreover, in order to
understand its “peace strategy” more fully these “endogenous” changes must
be considered in light of the “exogenous” constitutional reconfiguration of
the United Kingdom polity. Indeed, it is argued here that New Labour‟s
policy towards Northern Ireland should be understood, can only be
understood, in relation to the party‟s successful synergy of both of these key
drivers in its political discourse.
The “New” in New Labour’s Northern Ireland Policy
Drawing on the interpretive work of Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 2006)
this article critically analyses New Labour‟s political discourse on the
Northern Ireland peace process. In methodological terms, the interpretive
approach is concerned with traditions, contexts and dilemmas in politics.
“Tradition”, in the sense that Bevir and Rhodes deploy the concept, acts as a
backdrop but does not fix everything; it is “an initial influence” on actors that
colours their later actions but is always contingent (Finlayson et al., 2004, p.
150). In many ways traditions are enabling ideological backdrops, against
which actors are permitted to make informed choices within a specific sociopolitical context. Moreover, when an actor becomes conscious of the rigid
restrictions that may be placed upon their future actions by adhering to such
traditions it is possible for them to lighten their ideological baggage by
embracing a new idea. The point at which this self-realisation occurs is
known as a dilemma. As Bevir and Rhodes (2003, p. 36) explain: “A
dilemma arises for an individual or institution when a new idea stands in
opposition to existing beliefs and associated traditions”.
Explaining Ideological Change within the Labour Party
New Labour‟s political discourse on Northern Ireland could be said to
have encountered such a dilemma. In line with Bevir and Rhodes (2003, p.
37) it is possible to demonstrate how, in order to “accommodate a new idea,
people must develop their existing beliefs to make room for it, and its
content will open some ways of doing so and close down others”. This paper
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examines how and why an ideological dilemma arose within the Labour
Party vis-à-vis its political discourse on Northern Ireland. In re-defining their
policy the architects of “New” Labour were keen to distance it from that of
“Old” Labour. As Bevir and Rhodes (2003, pp. 197-198) elaborate:
New Labour rejects the command bureaucracy model of old Labour
with its emphasis on hierarchy, authority and rules … New Labour
does not seek to provide centralised “statist” solutions to every social
and economic problem. Instead New Labour promotes the idea of
networks of institutions and individuals acting in partnerships held
together by relations of trust … Patterns of governance arise as the
contingent products of diverse actions and political struggles informed
by beliefs of the agents as they in turn arise against a backcloth of
traditions and dilemmas.
In the Northern Ireland context, as elsewhere, “the triumph of Blair‟s
vision of New Labour over other strands of social democracy represents the
outcome of a contingent political struggle” (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, p. 140).
The “contingent political struggle” – in the sense that it is employed in this
article – is shown to be as hard-fought-out between New Labour‟s own left
and right as it is with its electoral opponents in the Conservative and Liberal
Democrat parties.
In her political memoirs Blair‟s first Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland Mo Mowlam (2002, p. 162) reveals how the formulation of Northern
Ireland policy - in the wake of her party‟s victory in the 1997 British general
election - was born out of the necessity to balance internal tensions between
several Labour interest groups:
As members of a party with a long tradition of fighting for justice and a
fairer society, a lot of people in the Labour Party had been close
supporters of the civil-rights movement in Northern Ireland in the
1960s and 1970s, which translated for many into support for Irish
nationalism. But [after 1997] we were no longer a campaigning
opposition. We now had a clear position, standing, in my shorthand, for
“neutrality, with fairness, justice and equality”. That meant we could
do things as a government to further those crucial values, while at the
same times maintaining our neutrality in the talks.
However, the reality was somewhat more complex than Mowlam cared
to admit, in that Labour‟s policy towards Northern Ireland ebbed and flowed
according to a number of factors. Other variables not already mentioned
included the personal interests of individual leaders, their dexterity in
managing backbench critics in Parliament and the aims of certain Labour
interest groups. Furthermore, it was a policy tempered to a large degree by
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other domestic and foreign concerns of the day. Thus during his post-war
government Clement Attlee (Labour leader, 1935-55) took a pro-unionist
stance on Northern Ireland and invested heavily in passing legislation that
secured the province‟s political survival. Such favourable rapprochement
emerged directly from Northern Ireland‟s role in aiding the British wareffort. Conversely, during its long spell in Opposition under Hugh Gaitskell
(Labour leader, 1955-63) Labour maintained a close association with the
cross-community Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP), thus maintaining a
partitionist outlook. Only under Harold Wilson (Labour leader, 1963-76) did
the party pursue a more green-tinged policy, something subsequently resisted
by his successor James Callaghan (1976-79).
This ambiguous stance has led some critics, like Brendan O‟Leary
(2004, p. 196), to conclude that “Statements they [Harold Wilson and James
Callaghan] made before or after their premierships showed they had
formulated preferences substantively different from the status quo, but in
office did nothing that significantly advanced these goals”. The move in
Labour Party circles towards open support for Irish unity was hastened under
the leadership of Michael Foot (1979-83) and Neil Kinnock (1983-92).
Significantly, by the time John Smith (1992-94) had taken over from
Kinnock the Irish question had been subordinated to the wider electoral
ambitions of the party, where it was to remain until Tony Blair assumed the
leadership in the wake of Smith‟s untimely death.
It was under Blair that New Labour‟s policy on Northern Ireland
underwent considerable adaptation between 1994 and 2007 in which a
devolved settlement based on the “principle of consent”, not “unity by
consent”, became the central plank in the governing party‟s peace strategy.
Although in many respects it represented something of a clean break from
the rigid “green” (i.e. sympathetic to the Irish nationalist aspiration for Irish
unity) orthodoxy of the 1980s, it was nonetheless a by-product of the tradeoff undertaken by Labour‟s leaders in a bid to make the party more electable
while diffusing internal tensions on Ireland. Thus, the policy of “unity by
consent” was dropped in favour of non-interventionism in Irish affairs. While
this new departure was qualitatively different from the policy pursued under
Wilson‟s Labour governments of 1964-70 and 1974-76, it does share
common ground with that pursued under Gaitskell in the 1950s and early
1960s (see Edwards, 2007, 2009). An acceptance of majority consent,
regionalism, and a locally devolved administration had long since formed the
backbone of the party‟s immediate post-war policy towards Northern Ireland
(Dixon, 1993).
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Devolution
In his resignation speech on 10 May 2007, Tony Blair made just one
minor reference to Northern Ireland in which he said, “I think Northern
Ireland would not have been changed unless Britain had changed”. Change
in Britain, and in government policy towards the province, under Blair
centred round major constitutional and territorial adjustment, which saw an
effective return to devolved government in the three peripheral regions of
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Labour‟s commitment to devolution
remained strong during Blair‟s decade as Prime Minister and in some ways
demonstrates how New Labour sought to redress the issue of sovereignty in
the absence of a more radical “Old” Labourist agenda. Arguably, Blair,
rather than seeing devolution as an effective conflict management tool,
viewed its utility through the much broader prism of constitutional reform.
Before coming to power he remarked:
I find it odd to say the least that the government proposes devolution
for Northern Ireland as part of a package designed to keep the Union
together but says that devolution anywhere else is irresponsible and
reckless (Blair, 1996, p. 82).
The empowerment of the ordinary citizen became a recurring theme in
New Labour discourse throughout its first three terms of office. It is evident
in a speech made by the former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Peter
Hain (2006)2 at the time of the St. Andrews Agreement, when he pointed out
that: “Devolution gives local politicians the power to take local decisions
about local issues. I hope they will grasp this opportunity and fulfill the
obligations for which they have long been elected”. In New Labour discourse
this decentralisation of governance sprang from both a deep-seated belief in
empowering ordinary people and in a firm commitment to achieving a
peaceful settlement to this most enduring of conflicts.
A commitment to reconfigure the constitutional landscape of the UK
was the key point of differentiation between New Labour‟s policy towards
Northern Ireland and that of its political counterparts or predecessors.3 As
indicated above constitutional reform remained a crucial element of New
Labour‟s vision for a “New Britain”, wherein power was devolved to the
constituent (or peripheral) parts of the UK in a way that reflected the party‟s
own radical democratic socialist tradition. Tony Blair‟s vision for a “New
Britain” is evident in his Maiden speech to the people of Northern Ireland,
delivered at the Royal Ulster Agricultural Society in Belfast in 1997:
I want to see a Union which reflects and accommodates diversity. I am
against a rigid, centralised approach. That is the surest way to weaken
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1

- 64 -

Interpreting New Labour‟s

the Union. The proposals this government are making for Scotland and
Wales, and for the English regions, are designed to bring Government
closer to the people. That will renew and strengthen the Union.
However, it must be borne in mind that devolution was conceived for
an altogether different purpose in Northern Ireland than elsewhere in the UK.
As Bradbury and Mitchell (2005, p. 295) point out:
In Scotland and Wales the purpose of devolution had been to
accommodate national feeling within a decentralised UK. In contrast,
in Northern Ireland devolution had been a mechanism to reconcile
implacably opposed nationalist/republican and unionist/loyalist
perspectives on the nature of government and to assist a wider “peace
process” for scaling down sectarian violence between and within the
two communities.
A devolved, power-sharing arrangement between Protestant Unionists
and Catholic Nationalists became the preferred outcome for the settlement of
the local conflict. On a much broader level devolution, as a form of
federalism, is a useful conflict management device for application in
conflicts where ethno-nationalist feeling has spilled over into violence.
While there is disagreement in the academic literature about the effects of
federalism on ethno-nationalism (Hechter, 2004, p. 296), with some
commentators arguing that it exacerbates it and others that it accommodates
it, few would argue that it plays no role at all. In Zartman‟s (2004, p. 154)
view:
Despite the fears of many governments, autonomy is not a down
payment on secession: Cancellation of autonomy is. When minorities
are granted self-government in autonomy, it gives them something to
do that takes their minds off of secession and conflict and puts the
emphasis on skills at governing rather than on contesting government.
By emphasising devolution in New Labour‟s political discourse Blair
was afforded the opportunity to push the case for greater autonomy for the
UK regions, while at the same time taking the sting out of what M.L.R.
Smith (1999, p. 80) has called the „single most destabilizing force in British
politics for a generation‟. Despite the Conservative Party‟s hostility towards
devolution New Labour was able to successfully maintain “at least the façade
of bipartisanship” (Powell, 2008, p. 88) on Northern Ireland affairs.
Bi-partisanship
Bi-partisanship has been defined by Dixon (2001, p. 345) as, “a general
agreement between the two main British political parties on the principles of
the constitutional approach towards the conflict in Northern Ireland”. The
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acceptance of the so-called “principle of consent”4 in constitutional matters
has been central to the creation of a common approach to the conflict by
British political parties. However, bi-partisanship has not always been the
motivating factor behind Labour Party policy on Northern Ireland, as
indicated above. In 1981, owing to pressure from its left-wing who were
aggrieved by Margaret Thatcher‟s handling of the republican Hunger Strikes,
Labour officially declared itself in favour of a united Ireland, albeit by the
reaching of democratic consent within Northern Ireland (Dixon, 2006, p.
119; see also Edwards, 2009, Chapter 7). Nevertheless, the explicit meaning
behind this change in policy was later elaborated on by the former Labour
Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Kevin McNamara, who
remarked “Because I believe that unity by consent is the only viable strategy
for ending partition, I am convinced that the party should be actively
pursuing such a policy” (Tribune, 1 December 1989).
The tacit acceptance of bi-partisanship by McNamara and other
nationalist sympathisers in the 1980s - added to the increasing divergence
between Labour and Conservative policies on Northern Ireland - led some
observers to believe that a change-over in future government would herald a
return of a British administration sympathetic to the concerns of Irish
nationalists. Indeed, the NILP (Labour‟s „sister‟ party in the province) had
formally broke off its fraternal relationship with Labour on this very issue,
when, following a meeting with Michael Foot, the local party accused him of
pursuing “the idiotic and undemocratic policy of „rolling republicanism‟
which was adopted at the last party conference” (Belfast Newsletter, 4
February 1982).
However, the integrity of the Labour Party‟s nationalist bias and its
willingness to act on such instincts has been seriously questioned by some
scholars. As John Whyte (1993, p. 107) pointed out, although “There has
always been a minority in the Labour Party with united-Ireland sympathies”
(including former Prime Minister, Harold Wilson), “the limits of the feasible
have reasserted themselves, and in practice Labour governments, faced with
the adamant opposition of unionists to any kind of united Ireland, have
proved as committed to the union as Conservative ones”. Despite the ups and
downs in the peace process, bi-partisanship remained the most consistent
guiding principle of successive British governments throughout the Direct
Rule period, far outlasting the fringe tendencies of some interest groups
within the Conservative and Labour parties. In the House of Commons, as
Cunningham has observed, “the bilateral management of Northern Ireland …
[soon became] the orthodoxy” (2001, p. 159).
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Indeed, another dimension of New Labour‟s management of the peace
process has been its ability to sustain its bilateral relationship with the Irish
government, a process cultivated by John Major in the early 1990s. In its
1997 election manifesto, New Labour indicated its willingness to work with
the Irish government to secure peace in the province, and from his first
meeting with Bertie Ahern it later transpired that Tony Blair and the new
leader of Fianna Fáil had “hit it off immediately” (Powell, 2008, p. 88). The
personal chemistry between the two men, added to Blair‟s appreciation of the
nuances of Irish history, meant that when Ahern later became Taoiseach a
more concerted effort to solving the conflict could be adopted. As a result of
this transformation in Anglo-Irish relations Blair became the first British
Prime Minister in modern history to address the Oireachtas (Irish
Parliament). His speech had a dual aim: to appeal to the two communities to
reconcile their differences, and to reassure unionists that – unlike his
predecessors - he was not harbouring an anti-partitionist agenda. Thus, he
argued:
a framework in which consent is guaranteed is also one in which
basic rights of equality and justice are guaranteed … those who wish
a united Ireland are free to make that claim, provided it is
democratically expressed, just as those who believe in the Union can
make their claim … My point is very simple. Those urges to belong,
divergent as they are, can live together more easily if we, Britain and
the Irish Republic, can live closer together too (Blair, 1998).
It is in this context that Mowlam made the candid admission that
Blair had dropped the term “persuader” because it was politically loaded and
insensitive to the unionist community. Now, the emphasis was on bringing
both communities together to negotiate a fair and equitable settlement. The
logic behind this recalibration in Labour discourse was simple, yet proved
flawed in the longer-term: shore up the moderates at the expense of the
extremists.
Another point to highlight under the theme of bi-partisanship is that the
policies of the Conservative and New Labour governments towards Northern
Ireland were not that radically different. While tactics certainly varied depending on the tempo of progress made on the political front - the strategy
underpinning the British government‟s approach was not chameleon-like,
changing according to the party in power. In fact, rather than stressing
“consistent inconsistencies” acute to British policy, as Brendan O‟Leary
(1997) has suggested, it may be more profitable to agree with Michael
Cunningham‟s (2001, p. 153) characterisation of it in terms of its “strategic
continuity”. By far the starkest illustration of this can be seen in relation to
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the continuities of the Major and Blair governments (Patterson, 2001), when
“London returned to its traditional role as an honest broker and facilitator for
agreement” (Neumann, 2003, p. 186).
With the benefit of hindsight one could argue that Blair sacrificed old
Tory shibboleths about talking to terrorists for the benefit of safeguarding
momentum in the peace process, certainly this is true with regard to his
negotiations with republicans (see Edwards, 2008a; Powell, 2008, p. 313).
The revelations by Peter Mandelson (who replaced Mowlam as Secretary of
State between 1999 and 2001) confirm as much. Some years after leaving
Northern Ireland, Mandelson claimed that:
In order to keep the process in motion [Blair] would be sort of dangling
carrots and possibilities in front of the republicans which I thought
could never be delivered, that it was unreasonable and irresponsible to
intimate that you could when you knew that you couldn‟t (Guardian,
13 March 2007).
Mandelson‟s criticisms serve to reinforce the view that New Labour had
discontinued its dogmatic nationalist approach to Northern Irish affairs. By
shoring up the unionists – while appearing to grant concessions to
republicans - Blair was actually creating the conditions for the two groups to
come together. That he chose to do so by applying a mixture of “carrot and
stick” tactics points to Blair‟s sense of conviction politics noticeable
elsewhere, particularly in relation to foreign policy (see Chandler, 2003).
Nevertheless, Blair‟s relationship with unionist MPs, for example,
was not bound by the same rules that prevailed during his predecessor‟s time
in office. Ulster Unionist MPs had proved crucial in maintaining the
Conservative balance of power in the House of Commons for the duration of
John Major‟s government. With his 165 seat majority Blair was under no
such obligation, though he chose to keep unionists onboard, albeit while
endeavouring to reach out to republicans. Yet Blair chose to mollify unionist
concerns about his new government‟s agenda and sought to stress his party‟s
support for the “principle of consent” vis-à-vis the constitutional status of
Northern Ireland.
Consent
Although New Labour did undergo a certain amount of “greening”
during much of its long spell in opposition in the 1980s, close reading of the
party‟s discourse on Northern Ireland would challenge the assertion that its
policy was ostensibly anti-partitionist in its strategic outlook. Even during
the most radical phase of its Northern Ireland policy, the party‟s leadership
(including spokesman Kevin McNamara) did not endorse the left-republican
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view held by some Labour politicians (such as Ken Livingstone) that, once in
power, the party should coerce unionists into a united Ireland. In a report
McNamara co-authored with Mo Mowlam and Jim Marshall (McNamara et
al., 1988, p. 10), they declared, “openly to all the people of Northern Ireland
that we seek to persuade them of the merits of Irish unity and to win their
support for it”. As already indicated the principle of “unity by consent”
constituted the cornerstone of “Old” Labour‟s policy until 1994, when
“New” Labour gravitated towards support for a political arrangement based
on the “principle of consent” (see Neumann, 2003, p. 148; Powell, 2008, pp.
11-12).
The shift is evident in Blair‟s maiden speech on Northern Ireland, in
which he was at pains to set out his newly elected government‟s agenda on
consent:
My message is simple. I am committed to Northern Ireland. I am
committed to the principle of consent. And I am committed to peace.
A settlement is to be negotiated between the parties based on consent.
My agenda is not a United Ireland – and I wonder just how many see
it as a realistic possibility in the foreseeable future. Northern Ireland
will remain part of the United Kingdom as long as the majority here
wish.
Two important themes are discernable in the above extract. Firstly,
that Blair was keen to reassure the unionist community that his recent
electoral triumph posed no direct threat to the constitutional status of
Northern Ireland. Secondly, that New Labour‟s intentions for the future
peace and prosperity of Northern Ireland were genuine, and that any
impending British government initiative would be grounded firmly in the
principle of consent. Blair‟s speech was important because it signalled a
radical departure from the “green” dogmatism, which was widely perceived
to buttress Labour policy on Ireland (Dixon, 2006, p. 133; Powell, 2008, pp.
12-13). A discursive shift in New Labour‟s policy implied that constitutional
change (whatever form it may take) must be negotiated by all of the parties
to the conflict and then be ratified by both unionist and nationalist
communities.
This was an important first step in New Labour‟s bid to instigate a
strategic sea-change in its policy. As Blair‟s Chief of Staff, Jonathan Powell,
recalled:
This policy [of Irish unification by consent] had been an uncomfortable
compromise cobbled together in the early 1980s to split the difference
between two irreconcilable wings of the party: a small but highly
motivated band of pro-unionists and the “Troops Out” movement. The
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1

- 69 -

Interpreting New Labour‟s

result was a green-tinged ambition to achieve a united Ireland by
persuading the unionists to participate in it, even though it was
perfectly obvious the unionists were not going to be persuaded. Tony
replaced this mishmash with a policy of neutrality, where the job of the
British government would be to help reconcile the two communities in
Northern Ireland and find a solution that both could accept (2008, pp.
79-80).
Thus, New Labour had moved away from the old ideal of “unity by
consent” towards a new umpire-like stance on the peace process.
In many ways Blair had already prepared the ground for this shift in
Labour discourse prior to coming to office. Following the announcement of
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) ceasefire in August 1994, Blair‟s advisers
gave explicit instructions to Kevin McNamara that the party leader, not the
party spokesman on Northern Ireland, would handle the media on the issue.
Shortly afterwards McNamara was sacked, thus becoming an early casualty
in Blair‟s wholesale clearout of its more “tricolour-waving” old guard. He
was replaced by the more congenial and down-to-earth Mo Mowlam – a
candid politician with a sharp mind and a deep interest in Northern Ireland
affairs. Michael Cunningham (2001, p. 92) argues that “one has to be careful
not to exaggerate the significance of these changes”; however, it soon
became clear that New Labour had initiated a shift in its approach to the
conflict and Mowlam “fitted in happily with the change in policy” (Powell,
2008, p. 80). This is despite the fact that Mowlam, along with Peter Hain and
Clare Short (later to become Cabinet ministers in Blair‟s government), had
been involved in pushing the “unity by consent” policy. By 1997, Hain and
Short had embraced the new policy departure, although their personal views
on the matter remain unclear (see Dixon, 2006).
In an interview just prior to the 1997 election, Mowlam spelt out
“New” Labour‟s radical departure from “Old” Labour‟s pro-Irish nationalist
agenda:
There is now a general acceptance that the future of Northern Ireland
must be determined by the consent of the people as set out in the
Downing Street Declaration [1993]. Labour recognises that the option
of a united Ireland does not command the consent of the unionist
tradition nor does the existing status of Northern Ireland command the
consent of the nationalist tradition. We are therefore committed to
reconciliation between the two traditions and to a new political
settlement which can command the support of both (Irish News, 4 April
1997).
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Mowlam had demonstrated her ability to think more holistically about
what a potential settlement in Northern Ireland might look like. It also
permitted Labour to distance itself from the Conservative policy of
sympathetic support for the Unionist community, by maintaining a focus on
both communities. Many of Blair‟s speeches during his decade in office reiterated the need for parties in the conflict to end terrorism as a means by
which to achieve political ends. As he pointed out in 2001:
Look, underneath all the language and the detail of the agreement is
this very simple concept that there has to be the notion of consent, that
democracy rules, not violence, and alongside that there has to be justice
and equality for all communities … And in the end, what has really
been accepted by everybody is that there is no solution to this issue of a
military kind. Violence offers no way forward. We are never going to
change Northern Ireland by violence.
The changing meaning of consent became increasingly tethered to the
need to put clear blue water between the hard-headed realist view that war is
simply a continuation of politics by other means and the idealist notion that
democracy and co-operation offered a panacea for redressing the exclusivist
nature of ethno-nationalism.
Conclusion
The overarching argument of this article has been that New Labour‟s
“peace strategy” in Northern Ireland must be seen in light of “endogenous”
ideological change within the Labour Party, as well as the “exogenous” reconfiguration of territorial sovereignty arrangements in the UK more
broadly. By concentrating on articulating the benefits attached to these
rapidly changing constitutional arrangements, New Labour could situate their
internal policy adaptation amidst the new realities of governance in Britain.
As Powell (2008, p. 20) later reasoned, “No longer was devolution a mark of
the exceptional status of Northern Ireland, but rather a process going on
across the whole of the United Kingdom” and as such made it easier for New
Labour to sell a deal of power-sharing for local politicians. Initially,
government policy towards the parties in conflict was aimed at bolstering the
moderates at the expense of the extremists, a favoured tactic of government
sponsors of peace processes more generally (see Zartman, 2005). This
strategy, put in place soon after New Labour gained power, was summarised
by Mo Mowlam:
whatever had happened in the past, now the British government had to
be, in my mind a referee, especially when it was important to the
process to keep shoring up the moderate leadership on both sides
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against the hardliners on the fringes. We had to make progress and try
to reward either side for moving as we went along, so that they could
say to their followers they weren‟t moving first or they weren‟t moving
for nothing. It was essential to keep David Trimble and Gerry Adams
in place, because without them it would have been much harder to
sustain the peace process. (Mowlam, 2002, p. 164)
One of Blair‟s most significant early achievements was brought about
by carefully tempering his discourse within a tightly controlled framework of
reference for unionists. Thus, Blair encouraged David Trimble and the Ulster
Unionist Party to move towards a deal (see Trimble‟s comments in an
interview with the Guardian, 14 March 2007) for the benefit of the wider
unionist community.
However, as Trimble (2008) has recently admitted this was not always
successful and had the adverse effect of completely transforming the political
environment in Northern Ireland. Thus Powell (2008, p. 312) later confessed:
At first we tried to build from the centre, working with the UUP and
the SDLP. But in the end perhaps it was inevitable that peace could
only be made by the DUP and Sinn Féin on the principle of “Nixon
goes to China” – it is only the extremes who can build a durable peace
because there is no one left to outflank them.
In all of this Blair played a formidable role in the process by heavily
investing his own time in developing “peace strategy”. As John Rentoul has
written:
Blair brought his own gifts and his own luck to the issue which has
broken Prime Ministers and governments before. His relationship with
Bill Clinton was one, but his negotiating skill, his ability to finesse
issues of deep principle which Major, with his party‟s unionist
assumptions, found difficult, and his unnatural personal persuasiveness
were his unique contribution (2001, p. 418).
Encouraged by Powell (2008, p. 316) Blair sought to facilitate talks
between the parties in conflict by coercing them with enforced deadlines and
by encouraging the United States to apply its soft power as a useful third
party mediator. Blair‟s amiable relationship with Bill Clinton developed
significantly during the former‟s first term in office. Perhaps most
importantly of all was Blair‟s personal drive to solving the Northern Ireland
conflict, which was perhaps the one key component in helping to shape New
Labour‟s political discourse on the peace process. As one critic wryly
suggested:
The [1998 Belfast] agreement was testimony to his talent for creative
ambiguity, his gift for persuasion, his negotiating skills and his
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willingness to expend huge amounts of effort and ingenuity in a cause
that he believed in (Rawnsley, 2007).
It is often said of Blair that he failed in the foreign policy arena
(particularly in Iraq), but that he succeeded on the domestic front in Northern
Ireland. This is perhaps a little too simplistic and does not take into
consideration the remarkable dialectical relationship between the two
conflicts in New Labour policy-making. Indeed, the tremendous synergy
accomplished between the endogenous and exogenous variables driving
Labour‟s peace strategy in Northern Ireland was underpinned by the need to
reaffirm human rights, equality and democracy in societies where violence
had become endemic. Perhaps Blair‟s “failure” in Iraq was not so much in
the message he communicated but in the way it was interpreted.
Endnotes
* I would like to thank the editors for their suggestions on how to improve
the article for publication. Any remaining errors are the author‟s sole
responsibility. The views expressed in this article are the author‟s and not
those of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the Ministry of Defence or
any other UK government agency.
i

“New” Labour is the pre-fix given to explain the modernisation of the core
ideological parameters of the British Labour Party since Tony Blair became
leader in 1994. The term itself was used by those inside the party who drew
conceptual distinctions between “Old” Labour and “New” Labour in a bid to
make the Labour Party more electorally relevant. It implied a break with the
past dogmatism of the trade union dominated left-wing by the party‟s
modernising right-wing.
2
Rt. Hon. Peter Hain MP, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
between 2005 and 2007, made a similar claim in a guest speech to British
Labour Party members at Queen‟s University Belfast on the eve of the talks
leading up to the St. Andrews Agreement in October 2006. While his
comments were largely welcomed, his musings over the benefits of an allisland economy caused something of a stir (Author‟s Fieldnotes, 10 October
2006).
3
It should be noted that this strategy of constitutional rearrangement has had
some adverse effects, not least in fuelling the widely-held perception that
devolution has weakened the union. Ten years after devolution in the UK, 63
per cent of respondents in an ICM poll for the Sunday Telegraph said that the
union (between the constituent parts of the UK) had weakened under New
Labour, while only 18 per cent thought that it had been strengthened (ICM,
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2008, p. 7). The issue of devolution divides the UK‟s two main parties, with
the Labour Party in favour of further decentralisation and the Conservative
Party against. During his premiership John Major often made the point that
devolution threatened the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the UK. As
he wrote in his memoirs, “We advanced the argument, which I strongly
endorse, that the Union still had enormous moral and political relevance in
shaping our society. Moreover, it was, and is, vital in enabling the United
Kingdom to exert its full influence in the world affairs. If the UK were to
split into its component parts it would not wield the same influence. Its voice
would be fragmented and marginalised” (Major, 1999, p. 421). However, the
Tories did not oppose devolution for Northern Ireland, which was often seen
as the only viable option for a settlement of the conflict.
4
The “principle of consent” refers to the internationally recognised
legislation passed in Britain and Ireland after 1998 which states that the
constitutional future of Northern Ireland will remain unchanged until such
times as the majority of the people consent to a united Ireland.
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